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Decision-making authority in respect of a child in an intact family 
is allocated using the concepts variously known in different 
jurisdictions as custody, parental responsibility (or 
responsibilities) or guardianship, with visitation, contact and 
parenting time acquiring significance where the parents separate 
or have never lived together with their child. Set in the context of 
international norms and using selective, comparative examples, 
this chapter addresses the evolution and contemporary 
application of these concepts. The child’s participation rights, 
historically-marginalised parents and the challenge posed by the 
intersection of continuing parental involvement and domestic 
abuse receive particular attention. 
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Many legal systems have long used the term “custody” to denote having overall 
responsibility for a child, sometimes distinguishing legal custody, the right to make 
decisions about the child’s life, from physical custody, the right to have the child in 
one’s care. The word has unmistakable possessory overtones and reflects an adult-
centred approach to family relationships. In disputed cases, it is burdened by the 
historical baggage of commodifying children as a prize to be fought over, with 
parents being cast in the role of winners and losers, something that does nothing to 
encourage co-operative parenting in the future.  
 
For these reasons, many jurisdictions have abandoned the term altogether, 
preferring a discourse that talks of parental responsibly (or responsibilities) or 
guardianship. These terms will be used in in this chapter, alongside custody, to 
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reflect its comparative nature. Where the child’s parents live together with the child in 
what is known as an “intact family”, the divisible nature of custody or parental 
responsibility is not usually significant, separability acquiring greater significance in 
respect of never-together or separated parents. 
 
Custody and the cognate concepts do not tell the whole story since parents and 
others who do not have custody of a child may still have a legally-recognised role in 
the child’s life through visitation, contact or parenting time and, while they are 
discussed in depth elsewhere in this volume,1 mention will be made of them here. As 
ever with international comparisons, similar terminology may mask differences in the 
content of the concepts at play and, of course, the law must be understood in the 
social, political and economic context in which it is operating. 
  
Set against the backdrop of international standards, this chapter addresses how 
domestic legal systems allocate custody of a child, in the first instance, before 
moving on to examine the resolution of disputes. The focus will be on what might be 
described as developed Western jurisdictions, different approaches will be illustrated 
by the use of selective examples and particular attention will be devoted to issues 
that are controversial or challenging in many jurisdictions.   
 
The international context  
  
Any international examination of a child-related issue necessarily begins with the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),2 the gold standard for 
children’s rights, ratified by all the countries of the world except the United States.3 
Three of its general principles are of particular importance for our present enquiry: 
Article 3, according primacy to the child’s best interests; Article 12, guaranteeing the 
child’s right to participate in the decision-making process; and Article 2, prohibiting 
discrimination on a range of grounds, including the child’s or the parent’s birth or 
other status.4 
 
Beyond these principles, the CRC recognises the important role of parents and, 
sometimes, the wider family group, in providing direction and guidance to the child in 
a manner consistent with the child’s evolving capacity,5 noting the common 
responsibilities of both parents for the child’s upbringing.6  Anticipating the possibility 
of parental separation, the Convention emphasises the child’s right to maintain 
personal relations and direct contact with both parents, save where such a course 
                                                          
1  Frederik Swennen, “Personal Relations and Contact Concerning Children”. 
2 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; (1989) 28 I.L.M. 1448, in force 2 September 1990. For a discussion of how 
children’s rights play out in specific contexts, see, Geraldine van Bueren, “Children’s Rights Within the 
Family” in this volume. 
3 This is not the place for a discussion of the peculiar position of the United States. Suffice to say that 
it has signed the Convention and many of the values embodied therein are respected in the law of the 
various US jurisdictions.   
4 General Comment No 5: General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (2003), CRC/GC/2003/5, para. 12. 
5 Article 5. 
6 Article 18(1). Reflecting the era in which it was drafted, the Convention proceeds on the basis of a 
child having two parents, not anticipating the recognition of multiple parents, discussed below. 
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would be contrary to the child’s best interests.7 In addition, states are placed under 
an obligation to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence.8  
 
Given its child-centred nature, it is unsurprising that the CRC does not use the term 
custody, although it is found in other international instruments including the Hague 
conventions governing international co-operation in respect of child abduction9 and 
on jurisdiction, and enforcement of parental responsibility.10 
 
Numerous regional instruments are relevant to child custody in the countries where 
they apply. For the member states of the Council of Europe, the European 
Convention on Human Rights is of particular importance despite making no express 
mention of children or parents. Unsurprisingly, it is regional instruments dedicated to 
children, like the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,11  the 
European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights12 and the European 
Convention on Contact concerning Children,13 that are most explicit in addressing 
many of the issues explored in this chapter.   
 
The starting point 
 
Developed, Western legal systems have long since abandoned the notion of the 
paterfamilias with almost unfettered authority over his children and, often, his wife.14 
Spousal equality is now the order of the day and custody and parental responsibility 
now vest in both married, different sex parents in the intact family. Despite legal 
parity, mothers continue to provide more childcare than do fathers,15 something that 
may become significant in the event of a future parenting disputes. The child’s 
participation rights, guaranteed by article 12 of the CRC, apply to the family setting 
as they do elsewhere,16  but the extent to which they are respected, in law or in fact, 
varies between legal systems and, in all probability, between families.17    
 
                                                          
7 Article 9(3). See also Article 8(1), where preservation of family relations is one of the facets of the 
child’s identity mentioned expressly. 
8 Article 19(1). 
9 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980, HCCH, No. 28. 
10 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in 
Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children 1996, HCCH, No. 34.  
11 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), in force 29 November 1999.  
12 E.T.S. No. 160 (1996), in force 1 July 2000.  
13 E.T.S. No. 192 (2003), in force 1 September 2005.  
14 Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law and Family in the United States 
and Western Europe (1989, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL): 97-98.    
15 The Global Gender Gap Report 2016 (2016, World Economic Forum, Geneva), 31-32; 
http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/balancingpaidworkunpaidworkandleisure.htm 
16 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No 12: The Right of the 
Child to be Heard (2009), CRC/C/GC/12, paras 92-96. 
17 Law Reform and Implementation of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (2007, UNICEF 
Innocenti Research Centre, Florence) (concluding that “laws that expressly recognise the right of 
children to be heard in the context of the family are rare” since only three of the 52 countries surveyed 
– the Czech Republic, Romania and Scotland – had such laws in place). There are other examples, 
including Germany, Hungary, Finland, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden and Russia. See 
further, Elaine E. Sutherland, “Listening to the Child’s Voice in the Family Setting: From Aspiration to 
Reality,” Child & Family Law Quarterly 26, no. 2 (2014): 152. 
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So much for married, genetic parents, but what of unmarried parents, same sex 
parents, other family members and the challenges posed by assisted reproductive 
technology?  
 
Non-marital fathers  
 
Historically, legal systems expressed societal disapproval of extra-marital sex by 
drawing a distinction between children born to married parents and those who were 
not, with the latter facing discrimination. As the proportion of non-marital births 
increased – now exceeding 50% in many countries18 – and moral policing abated, 
legal discrimination diminished.19 Negative perception of non-marital fathers 
persisted and, while they have achieved equality with mothers and married fathers in 
some jurisdiction, that approach is far from universal.20 They may continue to face 
challenges, first, in establishing paternity and, secondly, in the additional test they 
must pass in order to gain responsibility.  
  
A married man customarily benefit from the (usually rebuttable) legal presumption 
that he is the father of his wife’s child.21  In some jurisdictions, male cohabitants 
benefit from a similar presumption22 and there are often simple administrative 
procedures for acknowledging paternity where the parents agree.23 In the absence of 
such provisions and the requisite maternal cooperation, the father may have to 
establish paternity in court and DNA testing facilitates that process, provided that the 
mother agrees to the child being tested or the court has the power to do so.24    
 
Assuming he can establish paternity, the non-martial father has the same custodial 
or parental responsibilities as mothers and married fathers in some jurisdictions.25 In 
others, he may have to demonstrate that he is worthy of equal treatment. Echoing 
                                                          
18 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development reported that, in 2014, just under 
40% of births in its 35 member countries occurred outside of marriage. Individual countries showed 
marked variations, the proportion being below 10% in Greece, Israel, Japan, Korea and Turkey and 
over 50% in Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, France, Mexico, Norway, Slovenia, and 
Sweden. See, OECD Family Database, Chart SF2.4.A: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/family/SF_2_4_Share_births_outside_marriage.pdf  
19 Exceptions remain. For example, while the Succession to the Crown Act 2013 removed gender 
discrimination in respect of the monarchy in the UK, it had no effect on birth status, nor on succession 
to aristocratic titles. 
20 For recent developments in particular jurisdictions, see Luise Hauschild, “Germany: Reforming the 
law on parental responsibility” and Ingerborg Schwenzer and Tomie Keller, “New Rules on Parental 
Responsibility in Switzerland”, both in The International Survey of Family Law (2014 ed., Bill Atkin, 
ed., Jordans, Bristol): 145 and 457, respectively. 
21 See, for example, Family Law Act 1995, s. 69P (Australia); Uniform Child Status Act 2010, s. 4(1) 
(Canada); Children Act 1981, §3 (Norway); Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act, 1986, s. 
5(1)(a); Children’s Act No 38 of 2005, s 20(1) (South Africa). 
22 See, for example, Family Law Act 1995 s. 69Q (Australia); Uniform Child Status Act 2010, s. 4(1) 
(Canada); Children’s Act No 38 of 2005, s 21(1) (South Africa). 
23 See, for example, Family Law Act 1995, s. 69R (Australia); Uniform Child Status Act 2010, s. 4(1) 
(Canada); Children Act 1981, §4 (Norway); Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986, s. 
5(1)(b); Children’s Act No 38 of 2005, s 21(1) (South Africa). 
24 In Scotland, for example, the court has no power to overrule maternal refusal to have the child 
tested, allowing her to block or, at least, impede the father’s progress: Law Reform (Parent and Child) 
(Scotland) Act 1986, s. 6. In contrast, in Norway, the mother has no such latitude: Children Act 1981, 
§§ 5 and 25. 
25 See, for example, Care of Children Act 2004, s. 18 (New Zealand); Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 
3. 
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the words of the US Supreme Court from some two decade earlier,26 the European 
Court of Human Rights, in 2005, articulated the position up as follows: 
The Court does not agree …that a mere biological kinship, without any further 
legal or factual elements indicating the existence of a close personal 
relationship, would be regarded as sufficient to attract the protection of Article 
8.27  
 
There is a plentiful body of European Court case law on fathers who did 28 or did 
not29 pass that test. In South Africa, blanket paternal equality has been rejected on 
the basis that a “nuanced and balanced consideration of a society in which the 
factual demographic picture and parental relationships are often quite different from 
those upon which ‘first-world’ western societies are premised”30 justified a different 
approach. 
 
Donor children  
 
Development in the various techniques falling under the umbrella of assisted 
reproductive technology (ART), combined with their increased use, has created new 
challenges for legal systems, posing fundamental questions about the very meaning 
of parentage.   
 
Even before the advent of statutory regulation of ART, where a married woman gave 
birth to a child using donor gametes, her husband benefitted from the statutory 
presumption of paternity, the donor was excluded, custody vested in the couple and 
they could conceal the circumstances of conception from the world and, indeed, from 
the child, if they chose to do so.31 For other couples, the position was less clear and 
disputes were resolved on a case by case basis. 
 
Surrogacy was always more controversial,32 in part, due to its commercial 
associations33 and the scope for surrogates to be exploited34 and it is banned in a 
                                                          
26 Lehr v Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). See further, Serena Mayeri, “Foundling Fathers: (Non) 
Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality,” Yale Law Journal 125, no. 8 (2016): 2292.   
27 Lebbink v Netherlands (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 18, [37]. Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights guarantees respect for private life and family life. 
28 Sahin v Germany (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 43 (the father had lived with his daughter for the first year of 
her life and continued to have contact with her thereafter for some time) and Zaunegger v Germany, 
(2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 38 (unmarried parents had lived together for the first three years of the child’s life 
and the father had cared for his daughter for the two years following their separation). 
29 Söderbäck v Sweden, (1998) 29 E.H.R.R. 95, [32] (father’s contact with the child had been 
“infrequent and limited in character”). 
30 Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC), [29]. 
31 Deception of the child implicates article 7 and 8 of the CRC. In some jurisdictions mandatory 
disclosure to the adult child of the fact of donor conception, combined with disclosure of the donor’s 
identity, addresses the problem. See, Eric Blyth and Lucy Frith, “Donor-Conceived People's Access to 
Genetic and Biographical History: An Analysis of Provisions in Different Jurisdictions Permitting 
Disclosure of Donor Identity,’ International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 23, no 2 (2009): 174 
and Petra Nordqvist, “The Drive for Openness in Donor Conception Disclosure and the Trouble with 
Real Life,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 28, no. 3 (2014): 321.    
32 See, Philipp Reuss, “Surrogacy,” in this volume. 
33 In India, a favourite destination for foreigners seeking a commercial surrogate, if the Surrogacy 
(Regulation) Bill 2016 passes, commercial surrogacy would become illegal and altruistic surrogacy 
would only be permitted where the surrogate is a member of the (married) intending parents’ family 
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number of jurisdictions.35  While it is permitted in most US states, two early 
surrogacy cases illustrate the consequences of a lack of statutory regulation. In 
1988, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to enforce a traditional surrogacy 
agreement,36 but gave custody of the child to the intended parents, nonetheless, on 
the basis of the child’s best interests.37 Just five years later, the California Supreme 
Court upheld a gestational surrogacy agreement.38 While model legislation governing 
the whole range of ART techniques is available for adoption by the various US 
states,39 they vary in the extent and manner of regulation.  
  
While same sex couples were sometimes obstructed in accessing ART in the past, it 
is now widely available to them.40 Recognition of the child’s second parent can 
involve a complex intersection of their opportunity to formalise their own relationship, 
whether they do so, the consequences of that for parental recognition and the 
regulation of ART itself.41 That problem is avoided in the many jurisdictions where 
the legislation in place governing the parentage of donor children includes same sex 
couples.     
 
The United Kingdom provides a good example of an attempt at comprehensive 
regulation of ART. While the first statute, passed in 1990, provided for determining 
the legal parentage of donor children, it was shamelessly heteronormative in 
character.42 Happily, its 2008 successor is very much more inclusive,43 and provides 
that the woman who gives birth is treated as the child’s mother. Her (male or female) 
spouse or (female) civil partner is treated as the child’s other parent. Where the birth 
mother is not married or civilly enpartnered, the provisions are more complex but, in 
essence, as long as treatment was undertaken in the United Kingdom by a provider 
licensed under the statute and the mother consents, the child’s second parent will be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and subject to a range of other conditions. See, the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016: 
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-surrogacy-regulation-bill-2016-4470/  
34 Melanie G. Fellowes, “Commercial surrogacy in India: The presumption of adaptive preference 
formation, the possibility of autonomy and the persistence of exploitation,” Medical Law International 
17, no. 4 (2017) 249. 
35 While surrogacy is prohibited in some European jurisdictions, this has not prevented the European 
Court of Human Rights protecting the child’s Article 8 right to respect for private and family life: 
Labassée v France, Application No. 65941/11 and Mennesson v France, Application No. 65192/11, 
both judgments of the Fifth Section, 26 June 2014.  See also, Paradiso and Campanelli v Italy (2017) 
65 E.H.R.R. 2. 
36 “Traditional” surrogacy involves a surrogate being impregnated using donor sperm, often that of the 
man who plans to raise the resulting child, making the surrogate the child’s genetic mother. In 
“gestational surrogacy” the surrogate is an unrelated host, with the embryo being the product of 
gametes provided by the intended parents or donors.  
37 In the Matter of Baby M, 109 N.J. 396; 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) 
38 Johnson v Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).   
39 Uniform Parentage Act 2017 which, at the time of writing, has been adopted in the state of 
Washington. The earlier, 2002 version regulated ART and has been adopted in a number of states. 
40 See, Nicholas Bamforth, “LGBTQ Relationships” in this volume.  
41 An illustration of this intersection at play can be found in the per curiam opinion of the US Supreme 
Court in Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017), where it applied its own reasoning in its landmark 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 136 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), in holding the refusal of the state of 
Arkansas to register the birth mother’s wife as the child’s second parent, despite the fact that it did so 
for husbands of married women who has a child in similar circumstance, to be unconstitutional.  The 
Court will revisit this issue if it grants the writ of certiorari (petition No. 17-878, pending at the time of 
writing) sought in McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2017 WL 6508408.   
42 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK). 
43 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK). 
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the person who agrees to take on that role and gives the requisite formal notice.  
Thereafter, parental responsibility flows from recognition as a parent for spouses and 
civil partners, and from registration as a parent for other second parents.44 Surrogacy 
is accommodated by a form of expedited adoption which, subject to a host of 
conditions, including the consent of the surrogate, allows for recognition of the 
intended parents. It will be clear from the above summary that this system of bright 
line rules and state oversight is designed to facilitate the child having two parents 
and the exclusion of donors.  
  
Challenging the dyad  
 
Thus far, this discussion has been premised on a child having, at most, two custodial 
parents. Yet legal systems have long provided for more than two people playing 
significant roles in a child’s life in the context of open adoption; through recognition of 
de facto parents; and by permitting other persons like step parents, grandparents 
and the child’s siblings to seek custody or specific responsibilities.45  
 
When ART challenged traditional notions of parentage, it focussed attention on a 
more radical option: the possibility of a child having three or more parents. 2007 was 
a landmark year for multiple parentage, with courts in Ontario46 and Pennsylvania47 
embracing it, and reports of a similar decision in Brazil in 2014.48 More recently, 
legislatures in British Columbia49 and California50 have also taken this path. It is 
reflection of the controversy surrounding multiple parentage that the Canadian model 
statute, available for adoption by the provinces, makes provision for multiple 
parentage in the context of ART,51 while its equivalent in the United States applies 
the concept more generally and offers states alternative provisions, one allowing for 
the possibility of multiple parents and the other preserving the dyad.52   
 
Multiple parentage can bring multiple benefits. The child acquires an additional, legally-
recognised, champion (or champions) and there may be pecuniary rewards in terms of 
financial support and inheritance rights. The adults secure legal recognition and all that 
goes with it and have the opportunity to share responsibility.53 The disadvantage is that 
there are more adults who may find themselves in dispute, creating the potential for 
more – and more complex – litigation.   
  
 
                                                          
44 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, s 3. 
45 Haim Abraham, “A Family is What You Make It? Recognition and Regulation of Multiple Parents,” 
American University Journal of Gender Social Policy & Law 25, no. 4 (2017): 405. 
46 A.(A.) v. B. (B.) (2007) 278 D.L.R. (4 th) 519 (Ont. C.A.). 
47 Jacob v Shultz-Jacob 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
48 “Brazilian baby registered with three parents,” BBC News, 13 September 2014: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-29195890  
49 Family Law Act 2011, SBC, ss. 29 and 30.   
50 Cal.Fam.Code § 7612. See also, Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-a, § 1853(2). 
51 Uniform Child Status Act 2010, s. 9 (Canada). 
52 Uniform Parentage Act 2017, § 613(c) (US).  
53 Abraham, “A Family is What You Make It?” op. cit.; Susan F. Appleton, “Parents by the Numbers” 
Hofstra Law Review  37, no. 1 (2008): 11; and Lois Harder and Michelle Thomarat, “Parentage Law in 
Canada: The Numbers Game of Standing and Status,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 26, no. 1 (2012): 62 
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Resolving disputes   
  
Most parting and never-together parents resolve issues over the future care of their 
children by agreement or, sometimes, by default, with one parent simply ceasing to 
be a part of the child’s life. Whatever they decide, it is to be hoped that they prioritise 
the child’s best interests and respect the child’s participation rights. As with decision-
making in intact families, the extent to which that is the case will, necessarily, 
depend on the family in question.  
 
It has long been accepted that courts may not be the optimum setting in which to 
resolve disputes over the future care of children. The cost and time involved are 
amongst the shortcomings commonly cited, but the principal criticism is the potential 
of (particularly adversarial) litigation to generate or exacerbate acrimony. Various 
forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), including mediation, collaborative law 
and arbitration, have been embraced in the family law context.54 Such is the 
enthusiasm for ADR, in some jurisdictions, that couples are required to attempt to 
resolve difference in that way before they can take a dispute to court, with 
exceptions usually being made for urgent cases and those involving domestic 
abuse.55 ADR is not, however, a panacea and the fact that the parents have reached 
agreement does not necessarily mean that their solution is in the child’s best 
interests,56 nor that the child’s participation rights have been respected.57 
 
The best interests test     
 
Some parenting disputes are not amenable to negotiation and it falls to the courts to 
resolve them. Consistent with the CRC, in most jurisdictions the courts apply the 
“best interests test”, sometimes known as the “welfare test”, in reaching decisions 
and, indeed, in many of them its use predates the CRC. The Janus-like quality of the 
test, combining the virtue of flexibility with the vice of vagueness, has long been 
recognised.58 Its flexibility enables courts to engage in individualised decision-
making, assessing what will serve the interests of the particular child.  The price of 
flexibility is uncertainty and long ago Robert Mnookin famously described the best 
interests test as “vague and indeterminate,”59 opening the door to, almost unlimited, 
                                                          
54 See, Nuria Gonzalez-Martin, “International Family Mediation: Recent Developments,” in this volume 
for a discussion of a number of the forms of ADR used in family disputes. 
55 See, for example, Family Law Act 1995, s. 60I (Australia); Children and Families Act 2014, s. 10(1) 
(England and Wales); Marriage Act 1991, s. 26 (Norway). 
56 Eva Ryrstedt, “Mediation regarding Children - Is the Result Always in the Best Interests of the Child: 
A View from Sweden,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 26, no. 2 (2012): 220.    
57 For promising developments, see, Jennifer McIntosh, Caroline Long and Lawrie Maloney, “Child-
Focused and Child-Inclusive Mediation: A Comparative Study of Outcomes,” Journal of Family 
Studies 10, no. 1 (2004) 87 (Australia) and Deb Inder, “A comparison of child inclusive and child 
focused mediation models, their benefits and relevance in the context of family law practice in New 
Zealand,” New Zealand Family Law Journal 8, no. 4 (2014): 69. 
58 See further, Elaine E Sutherland, “Article 3 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: The 
Challenges of Vagueness and Priorities,” in Implementing Article 3 of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child: Best Interests, Welfare and Well-Being (Elaine E. Sutherland and Lesley-
Anne Barnes Macfarlane, eds, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016): 21, 36. 
59 Robert H Mnookin, “Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,” 
Current Legal Problems 39, no. 3 (1976): 226, 229. For a reappraisal of his earlier thoughts, see, 
Robert Mnookin, “Child Custody Revisited,” Law and Contemporary Problems 77, no. 1 (2014): 249. 
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judicial discretion.60 Since indeterminacy leads to unpredictability, it is argued, the 
incentive for the parties to negotiate a settlement is reduced, resulting in increased 
resort to litigation.61    
  
The challenge lies in identifying the content of “best interests”. What is relevant in 
assessing what is beneficial or detrimental to a child? Many jurisdictions have sought 
to clarify the content of the concept and to curtail judicial discretion by devising 
statutory welfare checklists, enumerating the factors that are relevant. A sufficiently 
broad-ranging checklist can provide guidance a court without diminishing the scope 
for individualised assessment,62 but whether they limit judicial discretion has been 
doubted and they have been criticised for being incomplete and for failing to attach 
relative weight to different factors or prioritise potentially conflicting factors.63   
  
These criticisms did not trouble the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC) when it recommended the use of a “non-exhaustive and non-
hierarchical list of elements that could be included in a best-interests assessment”,64 
something it saw as accommodating flexibility and individualised assessment. It went 
on to provide full discussion, not only of the elements it saw as central,65 but also of 
how the assessment and determination should be carried out, requiring evaluation to 
be by means of a “transparent and objective formal process”66 that incorporates 
“child-friendly procedural safeguards”.67   
 
Presumptions – and a rule  
 
While they are sometimes incorporated into welfare checklist, presumptions depart 
from the ethos of the UNCRC recommendations. Whereas a checklist operates with 
“the weight of each element depending on the others”,68 a presumption – even one 
that is rebuttable – starts from the assumption that one factor outweighs other 
considerations. While that may not render all presumptions incompatible with the 
CRC, it suggests that they warrant particular scrutiny. 
 
Two issues dominate legal and political discourse on parenting disputes. The first is 
ensuring that both parents continue to be involved in the child’s life, an approach 
endorsed by the CRC.69 Presumptions favouring joint custody and shared parenting 
have emerged in many legal systems in response to this imperative and we shall 
return to each presently.  
                                                          
60 Helen Reece, “The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct?” Current Legal Problems 49 
(1996): 267, 273; Stephen Parker, “The Best Interests of the Child – Principles and Problems,” 
International Journal of Law and the Family 8, no. 1 (1994): 26.   
61 Mnookin, “Child Custody Adjudication”, op. cit., 262; Reece, “The Paramountcy Principle”, op. cit., 
273. 
62 Robert A. Warshak, “Parenting by the Clock: The Best Interests of the Child Standard, Judicial 
Discretion, and the American Law Institute’s ‘Approximation Rule’,” University of Baltimore Law 
Review 41, no. 1 (2011): 83, 98. 
63 John Eekelaar, Regulating Divorce (1991, Clarendon Press, Alderley), 125. 
64 General Comment No. 14 on the rights of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a 
primary consideration (2013), CRC/C/GC/14, para. 50. 
65 Ibid, paras 52-79. 
66 Ibid, para. 87. 
67 Ibid, paras 85-99.   
68 Ibid, para. 80. 
69 Articles 5, 8, 9 and 18. 
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The second dominant issue is the need to protect children from exposure to 
domestic abuse, something identified long ago as harmful to children, leading to 
problems with behaviour, in school and in forming relationships70 and, in some 
cases, to post-traumatic stress disorder.71 More recent research has highlighted the 
impact of trauma on children and the long-term impact of witnessing domestic abuse 
on brain development.72 As we have seen, the CRC places states under an 
obligation to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence.73  
 
These two imperatives – continuing parental involvement and protection from 
domestic abuse – pose a significant challenge to legal systems. Their intersection 
has resulted in, sometimes ferocious, lobbying and debate that often takes on a very 
gendered dynamic with groups supporting (largely female) abuse victims clashing 
with fathers’ rights organisations. Presumptions that operated in the past are noted 
below before the various modern presumptions that seek to secure continuing 




In the past, parenting by separated and never-together parents often proceeded on 
the basis of one parent being given custody of the child while the other was awarded 
visitation or access. The older presumption that gave the married father primacy, 
post-divorce, disappeared. In some jurisdictions, it was replaced, for a time, either in 
law or in practice, by a maternal preference, particularly where the child was of 
“tender years”. The explicit gender bias embodied in that presumption resulted in its 
consignment to the history books as well.74   
 
Another approach that found favour in a small number of US states in the 1980s is 
the, facially gender-neutral, “primary caretaker presumption” under which the parent 
who discharged parenting functions in the past was preferred in awarding custody of 
the child, always provided that parent was deemed “fit”.75 While it has been criticised 
                                                          
70 Peter G. Jaffe, Nancy K.D. Lemon & Samantha E. Poisson, Child Custody and Domestic Violence: 
A Call for Safety and Accountability (2003, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA): 23.   
71 Sandra A. Graham-Berman and Alytia A. Levendosky, “Traumatic Stress Symptoms in Children of 
Battered Women,” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 13, no. 1 (1998): 111; Peter Lehmann, “The 
Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Children who Witnesses Mother Abuse,” Journal of 
Family Violence 12, no. 3 (1997): 241.   
72 Areti Tsavoussis, Stanislaw P. Stawicki, Nicoleta Stoicea and Thomas J. Papadimos, “Child-
witnessed domestic violence and its adverse effects on brain development: a call for societal self-
examination and awareness,” Frontiers in Public Health 2 (2014): 178; Robert F. Anda, Vincent J. 
Felitti, J. Douglas Bremmer, John D. Walker, Charles Whitfield, Bruce D. Perry, Shanta R. Dube & 
Wayne H. Giles, “The Enduring Effects of Abuse and Related Adverse Experiences in Childhood: A 
Convergence of Evidence from Neurobiology and Epidemiology,” European Archives of Psychiatry & 
Clinical Neuroscience 256, no. 3 (2006): 174.  
73 Article 19(1). 
74 Warshak, “Parenting by the Clock,” op. cit., 90-93. 
75 The presumption was famously articulated in Garska v McCoy, 167 W.Va. 59; 278 S.E.2d 357 
(W.Va. 1981). See, Richard Neely, “The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the 
Dynamics of Greed,” Yale Law and Policy Review 3, no. 1 (1984): 168. 
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as a backward-looking, thinly-disguised maternal preference,76 it lives on as one 





At first glance, joint custody is the most conceptually unambiguous way to endorse 
continuing parental involvement in the child’s life. Like custody itself, it may mean 
different things depending on the jurisdiction in question, and the extent to which 
parental involvement is equal may vary. It usually anticipates shared or joint parental 
decision-making, at least in respect of significant decisions, with courts often having 
the power to allocate authority over specific decisions to one parent. It may also 
denote the right to determine the child’s residence. As one US commentator 
observed, “the joint custody-sole custody distinction is best viewed along a 
continuum, not as a sharp divide.”78 
 
Joint custody emerged in the United States in the 1970s, becoming the preferred 
option in many states in the 1980s. In the constantly shifting tableau of state laws, 
generalisations should be offered with caution, but all states now permit joint 
custody, with some having a presumption in its favour.79 Parental consent is often, 
but not always, a prerequisite. Following the 1990 Congressional resolution 
supporting a statutory presumption against giving custody of a child to a spouse-
abusing parent,80 all states now require domestic abuse to be considered in the 
context of custody decisions, with many having a presumption against joint custody 
where it is present.81 
  
Sweden embraced joint custody earlier than many other European jurisdictions and 
provides a good example of it being adjusted to meet emerging concerns. In 1976, 
married and unmarried parents were given the option of joint parental responsibility, 
with the court acquiring the power to impose it, despite the opposition of one parent, 
in 1998.82 It is anticipated that parents will take all major decisions (everything 
beyond everyday care) jointly, although the court retains the power to determine 
residence and contact. In 2006, the law was amended further to take account of the 
parents’ ability to cooperate, the need to protect children from domestic abuse and to 
reinforce the child’s participation rights.83 Denmark and Norway followed the 
Swedish approach and have their own local variations.84  
  
                                                          
76 Sheri A. Ahl, “A Step Backward: the Minnesota Supreme Court Adopts A ‘Primary Caretaker’ 
Presumption in Child Custody cases: Pikula v Pikula,” Minnesota Law Review 70, no. 6 (1986) 1344.   
77 See, for example, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 107.137(1). 
78 J. Herbie DiFonzo, “From the Rule of One to Joint Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law and 
Policy,” Family Courts Review 52, no. 4 (2014): 213, 217. 
79 Linda Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure (2017 ed, Thomson Reuters, Eagan, MN), § 
5.1. 
80 136 Cong. Rec. H11777 (1990). 
81 Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure, op. cit., § 5.14. 
82 Anna Singer, “Parenting issues after parental separation: A Scandinavian perspective,” in 
Routledge Handbook of Family Law and Policy (2014, John Eekelaar and Rob George, eds, 
Routledge, Oxford): 235, 236-7. 
83 Maria Eriksson, “Contact, Shared Parenting and Violence: Children as Witnesses of Domestic 
Violence in Sweden,” International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 25, no. 2 (2011): 165. 
84 Singer, “Parenting issues after parental separation,” op. cit., 237. 
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Shared parenting – and the element of time 
 
Shared parenting seeks to ensure the continuing involvement of both parents in the 
child life, something supported wholeheartedly by the CRC, provided that course is 
in the child’s best interests. While proponents of shared parenting claim that it is 
beneficial to children,85 others present a more nuanced picture, highlighting the 
importance of the child’s developmental stage and the degree of parental co-
operation or conflict.86  
 
What distinguished some current law reform initiatives from the CRC and the 
UNCRC recommendations lies in the preoccupation with the amount of time each 
parent spends with the child, with some fathers’ rights groups calling for equal – that 
is, a 50-50 division of – parenting time. Allocation of time is about quantity and 
discloses nothing about the quality of the resulting child-parent interaction,87 leading 
commentators to warn that “a preoccupation with time as such might reflect parental 
feelings of entitlement rather than benefits for children.” 88   
 
With the exception of the approximation rule, discussed below, statutory models for 
shared parenting do not normally quantify the time to be spent with each parent. 
There is reference in some of the academic literature to the child spending at least 
35% of the time with each parent.89 That figure is significant in some jurisdictions in 
calculating child support liability,90 raising questions over the motive of some parents 
in seeking extensive time with the child.91   
 
Australia is often cited as the poster child for shared – or, erroneously, for equal – 
parenting time. The 2006 reforms there created a presumption of “equal shared 
parental responsibility”. 92 When it became apparent that this had resulted in 
inadequate protection against the child being exposed to domestic abuse, 93 the 
legislation was amended further, in 2011, emphasising that the presumption does 
                                                          
85 Linda Nielsen, “Re-examining the Research on Parental Conflict, Coparenting, and Custody 
Arrangements,” Psychology, Public Policy and Law 23, no. 2 (2017) 211.    
86 Jennifer McIntosh, Bruce Smyth, Margaret Kelaher, Yvonne Wells and Caroline Long, “Post-
separation parenting arrangements” Family Matters 86 (2011) 40. 
87 Mary Jean Dolan and Daniel J. Hynan, “Fighting over Bedtime Stories: An Empirical Study of the 
Risks of Valuing Quantity over Quality in Child Custody Decisions,” Law and Psychology Review 38 
(2014): 45. 
88 Bryan Smyth, Richard Chisholm, Bryan Rodgers and Vu Son, “Legislating for Shared-Time 
Parenting after Parental Separation: Insights from Australia?” Law and Contemporary Problems 77, 
no. 1 (2014):109,145. 
89 Linda Nielsen, “Re-examining the Research on Parental Conflict,” op. cit., 211: Smyth et al, 
Legislating for Shared-Time Parenting,” op. cit., 125.    
90 See Margaret Brinig, “Child Support,” in this volume. 
91 See, Karen Czapanskiy, “The Shared Custody Child Support Adjustment: Not Worth the Candle,” 
Family Law Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2015): 409 (US); Courtney Palmer, “Child Support and Shared 
Parenting in Canada: A Reality Cheque,” Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 22 (2013): 101; and 
Smyth et al, “Legislating for Shared-Time Parenting,” op. cit., 125-126 (Australia).   
92 Family Law Act 1975, s. 61DA, as amended by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental 
Responsibility) Act 2006.   
93 Richard Chisholm, Family Courts Violence Review (2009); Social Policy Research Centre, Shared 
Care Parenting Arrangements since the 2006 Family Law Reforms (2010). 
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not apply to cases where child abuse or family violence is present.94 Abuse and 
violence aside, courts are directed to do no more than “consider whether the child 
spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the 
child” and practicable.95 There is no presumption of equal parenting time. It seems, 
however, that the legislative developments created very real confusion in the 
country, with many people believing that “equal or shared care was the default 
presumption.”96 Recent research demonstrates that courts ordered equal parenting 
time in only 3-10% of disputed cases in the years following the reforms.97 
 
Shared parenting has found academic support in Europe98 and, while many 
European jurisdictions provide for separated parents to have shared responsibilities, 
there is reluctance to legislate for the amount of time the child should spend with 
each parent. For example, despite extensive lobbying by fathers’ rights groups in 
England and Wales in support of a presumption of equal parenting time, the 2014 
reforms there secured nothing more than the addition of a rebuttable presumption 
that parental involvement in the child’s life “will further the child’s welfare,” subject to 
an exception where such involvement would put the child at risk of suffering harm. 99  
“Involvement” is defined as “involvement of some kind, either direct or indirect, but 
not any particular division of a child’s time.”100 This reluctance to mandate equal 
parenting time may be no more than a reflection of the fact that families are infinitely 
varied and that individualised decision-making requires a degree of flexibility. In 
contrast, calls for a presumption of “equal parenting time” continue in a number of 
US states and, to date, they have had mixed success.101   
  
The approximation rule 
 
The American Law Institute sought to provide parents and courts with a predictable 
method of calculating how parenting might be shared when it proposed the 
“approximation rule”, allocating custodial responsibility “so that the proportion of 
custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time 
each parent spent performing caretaking functions”  in the past.102 It differs from the 
                                                          
94 Family Law Act 1975, s. 61DA, as amended by the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family 
Violence and Other Measures) Act 2011. See, Bruce Smyth et al, “Legislating for Shared-Time 
Parenting,” op. cit., 120.  
95 Ibid, s. 65DAA(1) (emphasis added). 
96 Smyth et al, “Legislating for Shared-Time Parenting,” op. cit., 119. 
97 Ibid, 135-140. 
98 Katharina Boele-Woelki, Frédérique Ferrand, Christina González-Beilfuss, Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, 
Nigel Lowe, Dieter Martiny and Walter Pitens, Principles of European Family Law Regarding Parental 
Responsibilities (2007, Intersentia, Antwerp), Principle 3.10.   
99 Children Act 1989, s. 1(2A) and (6), as amended by the Children and Families Act 2014. 
100 Ibid, s. 1(2B), emphasis added. 
101 In Arkansas, the court is empowered to award joint custody, that being defined as “the 
approximate and reasonable equal division of time with the child by both parents”: Ark. Code Ann. § 
9-13-101(a)(5). In Florida, equal parenting time legislation passed by the legislature was vetoed by 
the governor:  Alexandra Fernandez, “Florida Legislature Passes Bill on Shared Parenting,” WUFT-
FM, March 16, 2016: https://www.wuft.org/news/2016/03/16/florida-legislature-passes-bill-on-shared-
parenting/ See also, Michigan House Bill No. 4691, introduced in 2017 (presumption favouring 
“substantially equal parenting time”, meaning not in excess of 200 nights with either parent) and 
Kansas Senate Bill 257, introduced in 2018 (creating a presumption that equal or approximately equal 
time with each parent is in the best interests of the child.). 
102 American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:  Analysis and 
Recommendations (2002), § 2.08(1).   
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older primary caretaker presumption, since it allocates time between the parents, 
rather than “time spent” being the tie-breaker in a custody decision. The drafters 
made clear that their goal was “to clarify and define the best-interests standard 
rather than to eliminate it”,103 albeit some commentators question that is the effect of 
their proposals.104 
  
The rule permits of a host of exceptions, inter alia: to permit the child to have a 
relationship with each parent; to accommodate the firm and reasonable preferences 
of a child who has reached a specific age; to keep siblings together; to avoid an 
allocation of custodial responsibility that would be extremely impractical or that would 
interfere substantially with the child's need for stability.105 Other exceptions address 
abuse of the child by the parent, domestic abuse, parental drug or alcohol abuse and 
persistent interference with the other parent’s access to the child.106  
 
Supporters of the approximation rule argue that it serves the child’s need for stability 
and continuity.107 Others raise many of the criticisms that were levelled at the 
primary caretaker standard: the conflation of quantity and quality of time spent with 
the child; its backward-looking nature; and its potential for gender bias.108 While one 
commentator condemned it as representing a “19th century mechanistic view of the 
universe”, 109  something that is the antithesis of individualised decision-making, 
another observed that considerable judicial discretion is introduced by the 
exceptions.110 The rule was adopted first in Virginia and it is under active 
consideration in a number of other states.111 
 
Continuing challenges  
 
As we have seen, legal systems increasingly support the involvement of both 
parents in a child’s life, sometimes employing presumptions to secure that end. Most 
are alert to the danger of exposing children to domestic abuse, and seek to protect 
them from it, again using presumptions, this time against giving custody of children 
to an abuser or by making special mention of abuse as a factor that might warrant 
departure from other presumptions.112 Yet the intersection of these two issues 
continues to be problematic for legal systems, with lobbying for law reform often 
taking on a very gendered dynamic.    
 
                                                          
103 Ibid., § 2.02.   
104 Warshak, “Parenting by the Clock,” op. cit., 118. 
105 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, op. cit., § 2.08(1).   
106 Ibid., § 2.11(1).   
107 Katherine T. Bartlett, “Prioritizing Past Caretaking in Child-Custody Decisionmaking,” Law 
and Contemporary Problems, 77, no. 1 (2014): 29, 33. 
108 Warshak, “Parenting by the Clock,” op. cit.. 
109 Ibid., 162. 
110 Robert J. Levy, “Custody Laws and the ALI Principles: A Little History, a Little Policy and Some 
Very Tentative Judgments,” in Reconceiving the Family: Critique of the American law Institute’s 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (2006, Robin Fretwell Wilson, ed., Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge): 67, 76-77.   
111 W. Va. Code § 48-9-101 et seq. 
112 For a fresh examination of how such cases can be managed, see, Peter G. Jaffe, Claire V. Crooks 
and Nicholas Bala, “A Framework for Addressing Allegations of Domestic Violence in Child Custody 
Disputes,” Journal of Child Custody 6, no.3 (2009): 169. 
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As a wealth of case law in numerous jurisdictions demonstrates, some parents, 
motivated by nothing other than resentment or anger stemming from their own 
relationship with the child’s other parent, seek to damage or destroy the child’s 
relationship with that parent, obstructing their attempts to maintain involvement in the 
child’s life. While it is sometimes associated with the largely-discredited work of late 
Richard Gardner,113 there is no denying the existence of what is variously known as 
“parental alienation” or “implacable hostility”.114 Two qualifications are important to 
note in this context. First, children sometimes evince what appear unduly negative 
attitudes toward one parent for a range of reasons, some having more to do with the 
dynamic of family breakdown than with the conduct of the other parent.115 
Respecting the child’s rights requires that legal systems listen to the child rather than 
assuming a particular cause for the child’s position. 
 
Secondly, one parent’s opposition to the continuing involvement of the other may be 
motivated by the valid desire to protect the child (and herself) from the very real 
dangers posed by further exposure to domestic abuse. Domestic abuse is not solely 
a male-on-female phenomenon, sometimes being perpetrated by women against 
men and in same sex relationships, but that is how it manifests most frequently. 
Respect for equality is rightly valued highly, but that is no reason to ignore reality. 
Nor should legal systems be blind to the inherently controlling nature of domestic 
abusers116 who use presumptions favouring the continuing involvement of both 
parents in the child’s life to ensure that they remain present in the lives of their 
children and, thereby, their adult victims long after parental separation.117  
 
There is emerging evidence of abusers who create a narrative that uses the 
allegation of abuse itself as evidence that the survivor is engaging in parental 
alienation: that is, to characterise the survivor “as a pathological or vengeful liar who 
is severely ‘emotionally abusing’ her children by falsely teaching them to hate and 
fear their father”.118  A recent empirical pilot study in the United States found that 
abusers have employed this tactic successfully, with some courts appearing to show 
bias against mothers who report abuse and sympathy for fathers who claim parental 
                                                          
113 In his self-published work, The Parental Alienation Syndrome: A Guide for Mental Health and 
Legal Professionals (2nd ed., Creative Therapeutics, 1998), he described what he claimed was a 
“syndrome” whereby mothers so denigrated the child’s father that the child developed an irrational 
hostility towards, or fear of, the father and refused to have contact with him. His assertions have been 
rejected by numerous commentators. For an overview, see, Joan S. Meier, “A Historical Perspective 
on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation,” Journal of Child Custody 6, nos. 3-4 
(2009) 232. The American Psychiatric Association never accepted the existence of the so-called 
syndrome. Its highly-influential, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed., 2013, 
American Psychiatric Association Publishing, Arlington, VA): 715-716, discusses “Parent-Child 
Relational Problem” and “Child Affected by Parental Relationship Distress”. 
114  V v V (contact: implacable hostility) [2004] 2 F.L.R. 851 (England). 
115 Joan B. Kelly and Janet R. Johnston, “The Alienated Child: A Reformulation of Parental Alienation 
Syndrome,” Family Court Review 39, No. 3 (2001): 249; Nicholas Bala, Barbara-Jo Fidler, Dan 
Goldberg and Claire Houston, “Alienated Children and Parental Separation: Legal Responses in 
Canada's Family Courts,” (2007), Queen's Law Journal 33, no. 1 (2007): 79.   
116 Evan Stark, Coercive control: The entrapment of women in personal life (2007, Oxford University 
Press, New York).   
117 Allen M. Bailey, “Prioritizing Child Safety as the Prime Best-Interests Factor,” Family Law Quarterly 
47, no. 1 (2013-2014): 35 (US); Adrienne Barnett, “Contact at all costs? Domestic violence and 
children's welfare,” Child and family Law Quarterly 26, no. 4 (2014): 439 (England).   
118 Joan S. Meier and Sean Dickson, “Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family Courts’ 
Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse and Alienation,” Law & Inequality 35, no. 2 (2011): 311, 317.    
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alienation,119 findings that are consistent with earlier qualitative research in 
England.120 
  
Another way in which domestic abusers exploit the legal system is by misuse of the 
legal process, a phenomenon that has attracted growing academic attention 
comparatively recently. This manifests itself when the abuser uses the courts or 
other state agencies as a means of continuing to harass the survivor, and tactics 
include “a range of behaviors such as filing frivolous lawsuits, making false reports of 
child abuse, and taking other legal actions as a means of exerting power, forcing 
contact, and financially burdening their ex-partners.”121 Again, a facet of the coercive 
control dynamic at play in domestic abuse, it is also known as “abusive litigation”,122 
“paper abuse”,123 “custody stalking”124 and, rather more dramatically, “judicial 
terrorism”.125 While much of the research and scholarship comes from the United 
States, the issue has garnered attention in Canada126 and a recent study from New 




Making generalisations about legal systems is a perilous, if not foolhardy, business. 
These concluding observations simply highlight some of the key themes to emerge 
from this chapter using the CRC as the lens. 
 
When they allocated responsibility for a child, legal systems should accord primacy 
to the best interests of the child, the fundamental principle that sits alongside the 
child’s equality and participation rights. Identifying what will serve the interests of 
children generally is challenging, but most will benefit from the involvement of both – 
or sometimes more – parents and other family members in their lives. In a dispute 
case, however, the court is not making a decision about an abstract, general child. It 
is addressing the needs of a particular child, something that warrants individualised 
assessment of that child’s circumstances and listening to that child’s views.  
 
Respecting equally is important, of course, but it requires no more than treating what 
is the same in a like manner. It does not require treating different situations in the 
same way. In this context, it is crucial not to conflate adult equality rights with those 
of children. Sometimes the two coincide and legal systems are increasingly 
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separation” Feminist Legal Studies 25, no. 2 (2017): 185. 
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appreciating that the gender, marital status and sexual orientation of parents are not 
significant markers. Parental hostility and domestic abuse create a different dynamic 
since the presence of either can have a negative impact on the child. If presumptions 
are to be employed in decision-making, they must be crafted carefully in order to 
accommodate important distinctions.  
 
In the past, children were too often commodified, with their time being given to adults 
on the basis of custody and visitation. Employing a presumption that favours equal 
parenting time risks repeating that mistake by portioning out the child’s time in a 
manner that is deemed fair to the parents. It is only by having a child-centred focus – 
putting the child’s best interests first, examining the impact on the child of a particular 
course of action and listening to the child – that legal systems will meet their 
obligations to children.   
